Abstract. Shanghai Jahwa in the struggle for the control of company is the most focus event in capital market recently. Finally, the investor Pingan Trust took the real control of the company after overcoming the management. The conclusion is that analyzes shanghai Jahwa struggled for control of company, base on two relatively new perspective of the equity culture and corporate governance efficiency. Two conclusions are drawn, to begin with, capital is represented by Ping An Trust obtained absolute control of Shanghai Jahwa isn't caused by who is the largest shareholder, it is due to lack of equity cultures. A deficiency in market participants' comprehension and respect of equity essential characteristics and the essential meaning of equity culture what is protection of investors, especially small and medium investors. The result will inevitably lead to the value of shareholder plunged and the efficiency of corporate governance dropped obviously. Secondly, it puts forward that the aspect should be paid attention to, namely, the equity culture is significant to improving the efficiency of corporate governance and forming a corporate governance structure.
duties. Today, the representative of entrepreneurs-original core managements of Jahwa has been away from the company, and the representative of funds-Ping An Trust has completely mastered the control of the company, ending nearly two years of continuous struggle of Jahwa.
The investor and the business (the management) struggled for control of Jahwa, eventually, the investor won. One assumes that the result is obvious, because Ping An Trust is the first shareholder and capital representative. Actually, no.
The Cause of the Investors in Shanghai Jahwa Control Analysis
Direct reason: investment side Ping An Trust's strong capital strength
On the surface, Shanghai Jahwa dispute control results show that the power of capital. According to the public information of the Shanghai stock exchange, the former chairman Ge Wenyao of Shanghai Jahwa holds about 920 thousand shares of company stock, the former general manager Wang Zhuo holds about 610 thousand shares of company stock, but the company stock is nearly 672 million. Two people accounted for only 0.23% of the company's total holdings, but the actual control of the investment side Ping An Trust shares reached 26.78%. Even Shanghai Jahwa former management of all personnel holding together is far from this, management like Ge Wenyao and Wang Zhuo has more creativity, experience, appeal, professionalism, ability and other intangible assets. But entrepreneurs have a congenital defect that intangible assets are difficult to measure, unable to compete with the power of capital. After all according to the modern limited by share ltd management mechanism, any major decisions made by the company, need to be determined by the amount of capital. According to our country "Company law" and "Securities law" regulation, if convene a provisional shareholders' meeting, a single shareholder and a number of shareholders holding the proportion of the company's shares to reach at least 10%. If you passed a resolution at the shareholders' meeting, you need more shareholding ratio. The total share holding of former management of Shanghai Jahwa as an entrepreneur is even less than 5%. Not only unable to compete with the investment side, but also have no right of any significant decisions. So it will fail in the struggle for control of the company.
Root cause: the relative lack of equity culture, understanding of the basic characteristics of equity is not enough
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that Ping An Trust has a strong capital and occupy an absolute advantage in the shareholding ratio, so it behoove gained control of shanghai Jahwa. In fact, there is a deeper reason for Ping An Trust can finally control shanghai Jahwa. (Table 1) From table 1, we can know the first shareholder of Jahwa is Shanghai Jahwa group company. Because Ping An Trust effectively owns 100% of the company's shares, it became the first shareholder of Jahwa. The above data shows that, Ping An Trust's control on Jahwa isn't all it's cracked up to be. The stock share of Jahwa is 26.78%, there are more far-reaching 50% -the absolute holding status. It's just relatively dominant status. According to the relevant data of the china stock markets in 2012, the first largest shareholders in a listed company on average have about 32.57% share ratio, that is to say, Ping An Trust's share ratio is more far-reaching the first largest shareholders in a listed companies' average share ratio. Its control is also more far-reaching the average. Based on the table can be calculated: in addition to the nine shareholders of the total equity trust is 18.47%, they actually have right to decide. Furthermore, according to the "enterprises law", shareholders' meeting of listed companies has the right to recall the chairman and the board. It shall be adopted by shareholders representing more than half of the voting rights of the shareholders in presence. From this it can be seen that Ping An Trust's share ratio hasn't absolute control on Jahwa, its share ratio even will not ensure that it can take the actual control of the company. But the opposite is the case, Ping An Trust did. Therefore, the primary cause isn't that it has great financial capital (number of shares held). The following table is even more telling. (Table 2) From Table 2 can be clearly found that institutional investors, Shanghai Jahwa control is quite powerful, top 20 institutional investors shareholding ratio and reached 28.17%, has exceeded the first largest shareholder of Ping An Trust, and institutional investors cumulative stake of more than 35%. Jahwa shares from Ge Wenyao was removed from the group chairman and general manager of the beginning date of the rapid decline, the institutional investors have substantially reduced to Jahwa stock is also an important reason. From the behavior of institutional investors may safely draw the conclusion that, for Ping An Trust forced to leave the original management layer, and completely obtain Jahwa control in this result, the institutional investors is not recognized. Unfortunately, powerful voice institutional investors even do not recognize the results, but no thought of actively using equity's hands to fight for better results, but to take the negative strategies, namely with small investors as "Foot" investment. The reason lies in the final analysis, relative lack of stock equity culture in our country, the essential characteristic of equity market participants and the "Investors", especially the protection of small investors' understanding of the stock equity culture essence and lack of respect.
Equity culture is the rise of the interests of shareholders, promote equity investment and improve corporate governance background, as early as in 1996, Germany proposed, and is rapidly moving towards prosperity in the world, and in promoting corporate governance, capital markets and economic development and other aspects play an increasingly important role. Equity culture is the sum of the objective and idea, the moral and ethical, behavioral norms, institutional arrangements in the participants in the process of capital market activities. The core of meaning is respect for equity and shareholder interests, respected investors, especially the protection of small investors. Its fundamental purpose is to improve the corporate governance efficiency of listed companies and the formation of good governance structure, and promote the healthy development of the capital market. The essence of equity is ownership, its basic features are embodied in the participation of corporate governance and governance, which is the basis of equity culture. He reason why China's equity culture is relatively lacking, the fundamental performance lies in the capital market as the most important players and the dominant force of institutional investors on the basic characteristics of equity that is involved in the understanding and respect is not enough, its excessive emphasis on equity liquidity and profitability, the results of its behavior not only lead to a substantial decline in the interests of small investors, while their long-term interests have been lost.
The Analysis of the Impact of the Relative Lack of Equity Culture
The impact of the lack of equity culture on the interests of investors
Investors of institution had a strong control of Shanghai Jahwa event. Their reaction underselling shares due to the indistinct prospect of Shanghai Jahwa after Ge Wenyao deposed indicated that they didn't permit the demission of previous management who represent entrepreneur. After that the company was under Pingan Trust's control completely. However, the investors didn't maintain their permanent benefits, which means that they showed no respect to the right of participation in shares but focused on the short-term income. Since it seemed not optimistic about the future of shanghai Jahwa, they choosed to sell the shares and cash the realized gains. From the perspective of pure investment, the logic of the range of behaviors was no ground for blame, while it had betrayed the function an investor should conduct and fail to live up to the respect from the country. To promote the development of institutional investors is an important capital market strategy of the country. The purpose of which is to hope that institutional investors could uphold the right equity culture, maintain the stability of the capital market, protect the interests of small investors and improve the efficiency of corporate governance play an active role. However, institutional investors not only did not play its positive role, but also played a negative impact in a lot of time. Institutional investors use their own information and financial advantages, to buy shares at a low cost on the market, once the company has any unexpected circumstances, the first thing they come up with is to cash in their profits. That exacerbates the volatility of the stock price and makes the small and medium-sized investors suffer greater losses. In the case of shanghai Jahwa, in the first quarter of 2013, when the company before the intensification of the fighting, the stock bring 2.7 billion and 71 million profit to the institutional investors. Even after Ge Wenyao was removed from office and the company's share price fell sharply, the profits of institutional investors are still not cheap. The real victim in this stock crash was the majority of small and medium investors. They have always believed the high growth and future prospects of Shanghai Jahwa because of the beautiful annual report of 2012 after 1 year of Pingan Trust entering and hosting: operating income was 4.5 billion and 4 million, an increase of 25.93%; net profit to shareholders of the listing corporation is 614 million yuan, an increase of 70.14%. Many small and medium investors bought the company's share after announcement in March 2013, at that moment the stock price had been at a high level of about 65 yuan, which had risen more than 20% to that at the beginning of the year. Only after less than 2 months, due to the acute contradiction between investment and management, the company's shares plummeted all of a sudden and kept continue falling till now. Because of the disadvantages of the information, expertise and other aspects, it was difficult for middle and small investors to make the right decisions in a short period of time. While their number of shares holding of the company is negligible, they couldn't affect the corporate governance and maintain their own rights. What they got was to force to bear a substantial loss. As for the institutional investors, situation is totally different. They can make use of the powerful words in their hands, respect for the participation of equity, participate in Shanghai Jahwa Corporate governance and business decision-making process actively. They should have taken an active action when the contradiction came out between investment and management of Tianjin Sea Mew watch in October 2012 to avoid the expansion. By the analysis on the behavior of institutional investors, their high rate of Shanghai Jahwa shares holding indicated that they looked to further increase of the long-term development of the company. The reason for that mainly came from the fund from Pingan Trust planned to be used for creating a long-term strategy called "China's fashion kingdom", which presented a perfect combination between industry and capital. Since then, they should take the initiative in combination, to support the strategy that management hosts shares of Tianjin Sea Mew watch and enter the fashion industry in the shareholders' meeting. Since it is clear for them that the core competence of the company can be the key to achieve long-term sustainable development of the company, they should take advantage of their own equity restrictions on the investment side to do whatever they want. From Table 2 , the proportion of the top 20 institutional investors have more scale of shares than the largest shareholder Pingan Trust, it's not difficult for them to ensure the stability of the original management. However, due to the relative lack of equity culture and the disrespect of participation of equity, they only saw the profits on the book and became as same as the small and medium investors, to take a negative strategy to deal with the company's major changes, which also undermines the long-term interests of institutional investors themselves in fact. It can be expected that if institutional investors can really exercise the right to participate in the stock and participate in corporate governance actively, the capital and the entrepreneur can possible to combine together organically and perfectly as the production factors. Shanghai Jahwa is completely possible to become Chinese "L'OREAL" or even "LV", because China is now the world's first consumer of luxury goods, but there is no real world brand of luxury goods in China, the growth space of shanghai Jahwa's future is very great, at that time, the institutional investors can get several times proceeds than it is now. Unfortunately, because of their less understanding of the essence of the stock equity culture, and they can't hold company stock for a long time or actively participate in corporate governance, this leads not only huge losses for small and medium investors suffered, and a greatly losses for their long-term interests.
Analysis of the influence of culture on shanghai Jahwa equity relative lack of corporate governance efficiency
The core of corporate governance efficiency is whether the corporate governance mechanism under the established system can effectively reduce the cost of governance, so that the stakeholders in the enterprise operation to obtain the reasonable remuneration. The evaluation of corporate governance efficiency mainly has two kinds of methods, such as company performance evaluation and enterprise value evaluation. The main evaluation goal is maximizing accounting profits, corporate value maximization, maximizing shareholder value and maximizing the interest-relevant groups' value. Considering the simple accounting profit maximum result can not reflect the goal of modern corporate governance, and secondly, the accounting profit is vulnerable to the impact of earnings management behavior, however, corporate value maximization and maximize the interest-relevant groups' value in line with the modern corporate governance of the target concept, but difficult to measure. Taking the equity culture as the research angle of view, this paper mainly adopts the goal of maximizing shareholder value, in order to better measure, with the stock market value as the concrete evaluation index.
In Shanghai Jahwa investors and management to control for nearly 2 years, Shanghai Jahwa corporate governance mechanism is tested. Effective corporate governance mechanism to realize the benefit main body responsibility, right and effective configuration, governance mechanism is the key to success depends on the company in the company's business process, can effectively resolve the differences among the various stakeholders, coordinate the relationship between the parties, to ensure that maximize shareholder value. In this incident, because of the lacking of relative equity culture, the ability to coordinate and resolve the investor fails to play a major role conflict with the management of institutional investors see the efficiency of corporate governance is closely linked with their long-term earnings, ignore the equity participation, take the attitude of inaction in the process of the conflict, rapid deterioration in the relationship, seriously damaged the interests of all parties, of maximizing shareholder value slashed shares, corporate governance efficiency has fallen dramatically. During this period, shanghai Jahwa in every key events during the period of internal conflicts, are the direct causes of shanghai stock market value. (Table 3) From Table 3 , related events of shanghai Jahwa internal conflict directly leads to the stock market a substantial loss, and profit growth rate on behalf of the company's operating results also fell sharply, according to the relevant data. From May 10, 2013 that the day before Ge Wenyao was removed from Jahwa group chairman and general manager to 12 June 2014 that Wang Zhuo was removed from the shanghai Jahwa company directorships, Shanghai Jahwa battle for control is ended. Shanghai Jahwa's share price from 73.91 yuan fell to 50.88 yuan (right price), decline as high as 31.16%, cumulative loss of stock market value is 15.486 billion yuan. Thus, the relative lack of equity culture had a negative impact on the shanghai Jahwa company governance efficiency is significant, lead to shareholder value and corporate governance efficiency dropped significantly.
In summary, due to the lack of relative equity culture, so it has a powerful voice of institutional investors choose not to as, resulting in the capital on behalf of Ping An Trust to get control of the Shanghai Jahwa in the battle for control of Shanghai Jahwa; and because of the relative lack of shareholder's equity culture, institutional investors did not attach importance to the participation in corporate governance, led to the Shanghai Jahwa stock market and the loss of shareholder value in huge and the interests of small and medium-sized investors to become a victim. Jahwa appear unreasonable corporate governance structure of the corporate governance efficiency dropped significantly, the prospect of "Jahwa". The national brand is not good. Undeniable, equity culture is of great significance to improve the efficiency of corporate governance and to form a good corporate governance structure. Market participants should fully respect the nature of equity and promotes the protection of the interests of small investors as Jahwa for reference, so as to effectively improve the efficiency of corporate governance, protect security beneficiaries' rights, in the future of china's listing corporation in the process of corporate governance.
